Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy / Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson.

by Acemoglu, DaronLooking glass; Robinson, James A., 1960-Looking glass.

Publisher: Cambridge ; Cambridge University Press, 2006.Description: xv, 416 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm.ISBN: 0521855268.Subject(s): Comparative governmentLooking glass | Democracy -- Economic aspectsLooking glass | DemocratizationLooking glass | DictatorshipLooking glass | EqualityLooking glass | Political cultureLooking glass
Contents:
Questions and answers -- Paths of political development -- Our argument -- What do we know about democracy? -- Modeling politics -- Democratic politics -- Nondemocratic politics -- The creation and consolidation of democracy -- Democratization -- Coups and consolidation -- Putting the models to work -- The role of the middle class -- Economic structure and democracy -- Globalization and democracy -- Conclusions and the future of democracy.
Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 381-399) and index.
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Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal. Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association as the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the forthcoming text Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Harvard Faculty Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of the forthcoming book Natural Experiments in History.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 381-399) and index.

Questions and answers -- Paths of political development -- Our argument -- What do we know about democracy? -- Modeling politics -- Democratic politics -- Nondemocratic politics -- The creation and consolidation of democracy -- Democratization -- Coups and consolidation -- Putting the models to work -- The role of the middle class -- Economic structure and democracy -- Globalization and democracy -- Conclusions and the future of democracy.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

  • Preface (p. xi)
  • Part 1 Questions and Answers
  • 1 Paths of Political Development (p. 1)
  • 1 Britain (p. 2)
  • 2 Argentina (p. 5)
  • 3 Singapore (p. 8)
  • 4 South Africa (p. 10)
  • 5 The Agenda (p. 14)
  • 2 Our Argument (p. 15)
  • 1 Democracy versus Nondemocracy (p. 16)
  • 2 Building Blocks of Our Approach (p. 19)
  • 3 Toward Our Basic Story (p. 22)
  • 4 Our Theory of Democratization (p. 23)
  • 5 Democratic Consolidation (p. 30)
  • 6 Determinants of Democracy (p. 31)
  • 7 Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict (p. 42)
  • 8 Democracy in a Picture (p. 43)
  • 9 Overview of the Book (p. 46)
  • 3 What Do We Know about Democracy? (p. 48)
  • 1 Measuring Democracy (p. 48)
  • 2 Patterns of Democracy (p. 51)
  • 3 Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution (p. 58)
  • 4 Crises and Democracy (p. 65)
  • 5 Social Unrest and Democratization (p. 65)
  • 6 The Literature (p. 75)
  • 7 Our Contribution (p. 80)
  • Part 2 Modeling Politics
  • 4 Democratic Politics (p. 89)
  • 1 Introduction (p. 89)
  • 2 Aggregating Individual Preferences (p. 91)
  • 3 Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem (p. 92)
  • 4 Our Workhorse Models (p. 99)
  • 5 Democracy and Political Equality (p. 113)
  • 6 Conclusion (p. 117)
  • 5 Nondemocratic Politics (p. 118)
  • 1 Introduction (p. 118)
  • 2 Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics (p. 120)
  • 3 Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies (p. 128)
  • 4 Commitment Problems (p. 133)
  • 5 A Simple Game of Promises (p. 144)
  • 6 A Dynamic Model (p. 151)
  • 7 Incentive-Compatible Promises (p. 161)
  • 8 Conclusion (p. 171)
  • Part 3 The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy
  • 6 Democratization (p. 173)
  • 1 Introduction (p. 173)
  • 2 The Role of Political Institutions (p. 173)
  • 3 Preferences over Political Institutions (p. 176)
  • 4 Political Power and Institutions (p. 177)
  • 5 A Static Model of Democratization (p. 181)
  • 6 Democratization or Repression? (p. 186)
  • 7 A Dynamic Model of Democratization (p. 193)
  • 8 Subgame Perfect Equilibria (p. 201)
  • 9 Alternative Political Identities (p. 203)
  • 10 Targeted Transfers (p. 207)
  • 11 Power of the Elites in Democracy (p. 207)
  • 12 Ideological Preferences over Regimes (p. 211)
  • 13 Democratization in a Picture (p. 214)
  • 14 Equilibrium Revolutions (p. 215)
  • 15 Conclusion (p. 218)
  • 7 Coups and Consolidation (p. 221)
  • 1 Introduction (p. 221)
  • 2 Incentives for Coups (p. 224)
  • 3 A Static Model of Coups (p. 225)
  • 4 A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy (p. 231)
  • 5 Alternative Political Identities (p. 246)
  • 6 Targeted Transfers (p. 246)
  • 7 Power in Democracy and Coups (p. 247)
  • 8 Consolidation in a Picture (p. 249)
  • 9 Defensive Coups (p. 251)
  • 10 Conclusion (p. 253)
  • Part 4 Putting the Models to Work
  • 8 The Role of the Middle Class (p. 255)
  • 1 Introduction (p. 255)
  • 2 The Three-Class Model (p. 259)
  • 3 Emergence of Partial Democracy (p. 262)
  • 4 From Partial to Full Democracy (p. 267)
  • 5 Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer (p. 273)
  • 6 Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners (p. 278)
  • 7 The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy (p. 283)
  • 8 Conclusion (p. 285)
  • 9 Economic Structure and Democracy (p. 287)
  • 1 Introduction (p. 287)
  • 2 Economic Structure and Income Distribution (p. 290)
  • 3 Political Conflict (p. 292)
  • 4 Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy (p. 293)
  • 5 Costs of Coup on Capital and Land (p. 296)
  • 6 Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy (p. 300)
  • 7 Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists (p. 307)
  • 8 Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice (p. 312)
  • 9 Economic Institutions (p. 313)
  • 10 Human Capital (p. 316)
  • 11 Conjectures about Political Development (p. 317)
  • 12 Conclusion (p. 319)
  • 10 Globalization and Democracy (p. 321)
  • 1 Introduction (p. 321)
  • 2 A Model of an Open Economy (p. 325)
  • 3 Political Conflict - Democratic Consolidation (p. 331)
  • 4 Political Conflict - Transition to Democracy (p. 334)
  • 5 Financial Integration (p. 338)
  • 6 Increased Political Integration (p. 343)
  • 7 Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade (p. 344)
  • 8 Conclusion (p. 347)
  • Part 5 Conclusions and the Future of Democracy
  • 11 Conclusions and the Future of Democracy (p. 349)
  • 1 Paths of Political Development Revisited (p. 349)
  • 2 Extensions and Areas for Future Research (p. 355)
  • 3 The Future of Democracy (p. 358)
  • Part 6 Appendix
  • 12 Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy (p. 361)
  • 1 Introduction (p. 361)
  • 2 Probabilistic Voting Models (p. 361)
  • 3 Lobbying (p. 367)
  • 4 Partisan Politics and Political Capture (p. 373)
  • Bibliography (p. 381)
  • Index (p. 401)

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